Abstract. Analyses of the welfare system generally examine one of five competing models: (1) The work disincentive model; (2) the human capital model; (3) the macroeconomic model; (4) the public choice model; or (5) the cost-of-job-loss model. This paper employs the Granger causality concept and the multiple-rank F statistic to test the implications of all five of these models simultaneously. The results offer modest support to all but the macroeconomic model. The relationships among welfare benefits, caseloads, and labor market conditions appear to be too complex to be fully captured by a single model.
Introduction
Since the inception of public assistance programs, critics have argued that offering benefits, however well-intended, would reward and thus create poverty. For example, after visiting England and reviewing its Poor Laws, Benjamin Franklin (1776) commented, "In short, you offered a premium for the encouragement of idleness, and you should not now wonder that it has had its effect in the increase in poverty."
Many social scientists have investigated this work disincentive hypothesis. For example, Moffitt (! 987) analyzes cross-sectional data and finds that higher AFDC guarantee levels are associated with a greater likelihood of welfare participation. Duncan (1984) analyzes panel data and finds that most welfare recipients receive benefits for only a short period of time and typically join the welfare rolls following a change in family composition (e.g., divorce or birth of a child). Murray (1984) presents time series plots which show that the number of mother-only families and the welfare caseload have both increased since the War on Poverty began, suggesting that the expansion of welfare created more poverty.
Examination of all types of data on welfare variables is important; however, visual comparison of time series plots hardly constitutes rigorous analysis. More sophisticated time series techniques are available; for example, macroeconomists have used testable causality concepts quite fruitfully in the study of money, income, and prices (e.g., Sims 1972, Holmes and Hutton, 1992).
Welfare analysts generally rely on cross-sectional or panel data and thus rarely employ such time series techniques.1 This omission creates a gap in the analysis of the effects of welfare benefits -a useful analytical tool has been overlooked. Causality tests could improve our understanding of the relationship between welfare benefits, caseloads, and labor market conditions over time. While these tests are not perfect and new techniques are still evolving, they do provide the best available evidence on causality when controlled experiments are not possible.
Granger causality tests determine whether past values of a variable X significantly improve the forecast of the current value of another variable Y. If information on past X is a statistically significant predictor of current Y then X "Granger-causes" Y. That is, the Granger test identifies a variable X as causal if changes in X both precede and are significant predictors of changes in another variable Y. Philosophically this is a limited concept of causality; it is, however, a testable concept.
A basic technical criticism of Granger causality tests is that the standard Ftest of joint significance, upon which the test relies, can be misleading in the presence of nonlinearities and heteroscedastic errors. Consequently we employ an alternative test statistic, the multiple-rank F statistic, as suggested by Holmes and Hutton (1992) . This non-parametric test statistic results from standard regression analysis of ranked, rather than raw, data. Monte Carlo studies show that this test statistic is less sensitive to error distribution and nonlinearities. The present analysis uses this test statistic and the Granger-causality concept to test formally for causal patterns among AFDC benefits, the AFDC caseload, the unemployment rate, and average earnings in Michigan. The focus on one state avoids the aggregation bias inherent in analysis of national averages. Of particular interest is whether AFDC benefits cause, in the Granger sense, the AFDC caseload.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the work disincentive model as well as four competing models of the welfare caseload. Each model's predicted patterns of causality are identified. For example, if the work disincentive hypothesis is correct we would observe that benefits cause the caseload. Section 2 describes the methodology and the data. Section 3 reports the results of the causality tests. Section 4 presents a summary and conclusions.
Models of the welfare caseload
Prior studies typically examine one of five competing models of the welfare caseload: (1) The work disincentive model; (2) the human capital model; (3) the macroeconomic model; (4) the public choice model; and (5) the cost-of-jobloss model. First, the work disincentive hypothesis derives from a simple
